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Chirot and Mccauley would be accused by William Sewell of committing
the fallacy of experimental time by engaging in transhistorical theorizing, in
this case about genocide, by fracturing history and comparing cases under a
common label (mass killing) and ignoring both differences in societies and the
context of particular historical conditions. Though even guiltier of the charge
of loose generalization, they are most guilty of illogically slipping from a
general truth to an associated generalization that has no demonstrated val-
idity. lf they cannot make the diagnosis correctly, I will spend no time on
the modes of prevention advocated.
The authors are, however, innocent of the hype of the publisherb publicisn,
who think the authors believe that impulses and emotions both explain andjustify mass killing. "What dark impulses lurk in our minds that even today
can justify the eradication of thousands even millions of unarmed human
beings caught up in the crossfire of political, cultural 0rethnic hostilities? . . . lf geno-
cide is to become a grisly relic of the past, we must fully comprehend the
complex history of violent conflict and the struggle between hatred and tolerance
that is waged in the human heart" (my italics). Though the dustjacket insists
that this question lies at the heart of this book, it does not, for blind hatred
of the Other is both transformed by cognitively legitimizing the perception of
the Other as a threat while conjoining that perception with a feurr for the
actual perpetrator's own safety: "Fear of reprisals for not killing, including the
fear of death, is another part of what moves perpetrators" (90). However, only
when those emotions are transformed-when hatred and real fear of one's
own safety conjoined with love of one's own group, are mutated into a cognitive
system ofjustification-is Eenocide, and notjust a prejudice or even a pogrom,
allowed to take place. According to the authors, genocide is not driven by
impulses but by a ruthless logic even though they state that "hate is more an
explanation of genocide for leaders than for followers" (91). Logic explains.
But that same logic does notjustify genocide per se; it only provides a justifica-
tion forthe actual killers, which is provided by elites who demonizethe Other as
an infectious agent that needs to be exterminated.
Third, victims are not killed because they are caught up in the crossfire of
ethnic or cultural hostilities. They are deliberately targeted by the group in
authority with control over powerful, coercive instruments. ln the modern
period, this is the state. Finally, there is no struggle between hatred and toler-
ance that produces genocide when hatred wins. Rather the authors transmute
tolerance into self-hate and demonize self-preservation by equating that effort
with demonizing the Other as an alien, an Other wofthy of extermination.
How one gets on this slippery illogical slope is never explained other than
pointing to an abstract logic and the possibility that when groups stand in
the way of economic gain they may be exterminated (131). "lt is part of our
central contention that all such cases [of mass killingl, whether large or
small, have a logic and rationale behind them" (4), Mass killing is perceived
as intentional and deliberate on the part of the authorities with a goal and a
process of reasoning that determines that mass killing is the best way to
achieve that goal. Thus, although elites create the rationale, their hatred
and reification of the Other goes deeper than the relatively superficial
emotions of the actual killers, "[L]arge scale genocidal acts are the result of
planning and of long-lasting, not short-term, passions and ideologies" (60).
The Other must be characterized as a continuing threat (63).
Pain-aggression anger as a blind impulse may be present in the short term,
but what is required is the cognitive appraisal of a moral violation
(insult-anger) so that the target is considered morally repugnant (66-67).
So both fear and anger as emotions of the moment have to be mutated into
cognitive processes,
How did the publicists come to emphasize impulses and emotions?
Because. according to the authors, the authorities play on a lust for
killing and manipulate passions (5). sometimes the rationale may be con-
venience and a calculated instrumental opportunity, or it may be revenge
or even fear that if the enemy is not totally destroyed, it will rise up and
retaliate against the group conducting the mass killing, or it can be a
combination of two of these factors or even all three as in the mass
killing of the Herero in southwest Africa by the Kaiserb Germany.
Finally, that fear may not be of retaliation, but diabolic destruction
from within by an agent characterized as a bacillus or poilutant, a fear
that without this cleansing, catastrophe will result. Whatever the ration-
ale, humans are predisposed to distrust and fear competing groups that
are susceptible to stereotyping and demonization. Feelings of threat,
anger, shame for past humiliations, resentment as well as disgust, all pre-
dispose us to violence and, therefore, to mass murder, when other groups
stand in our way and are believed to threaten us. The "dark impulses" (7)
by which normal human beings are all too ready to kill by category are
ready to be manipulated. However, it is the logic of mass murder that
must be understood and countered. Then why do the elite leaders who
perpetrate the genocide have to reinforce these fears of the other by con-
vincing ordinary people that their own lives will be endangered if they do
not become "willing executioners"?
Though all four factors facilitate mass killing, the overwhelming power one
group has over another plays the crucial role. In the modern period, that over-
whelming power is located in the state because its resources are crucial for
defense and economic well being and because minorities without control of
a state are at great risk. State authorities use camaraderie, group identifi-
cation, binding mutual responsibility, leadership training, and an appeal
both to potential perpetrators' emotions and their sense of duty. Using
these means, they manage to persuade ordinary people to overcome their
inhibitions and participate in mass murder by providing a legitimate auth-
ority and a personal self-interest, lest their own lives be in danger,
There is now widespread agreement that for genocide to take place a group
must be made the Other, must be converted into an alien and then a threaten-
ing enemy. Furthermore, the Other is viewed as an enemy that works
insidiously from within and, thus, is the greatestthreat of all. How perpetrators
move from one category to a more extreme one is not understood as all con-
ceptions are homogenized into a common set of conditions just as mass
killing covers a widely varied set of phenomena. Further, the elites in the
modern world who perpetrate the demonization of the Other seize and use
the power of the state in the context of war, a context to which the authors
pay too little attention. Instead, they illogically equate essentializing the
Other as worthy of extermination with the policies of states that assume
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responsibility for one group and, thus, include laws of return for descendents
of their own citizens-as Germany, lsrael, and other countries do. The authors,
as do others, falsely equate this with a nationalism of blood, which, if true,
would not allow spouses or converts to Judaism, in the case of lsrael. to
become citizens under such a law. However, the authors go further in
blaming the victims, for it is the Jews who "left us a religious traditionjustifying
total war" because they told stories of genocide and advocated purity when
they should have accepted exogamy and integration (110).
Without evidence or logical argument, the authors engage in the same
illogic of genocidal perpetrators, so that "Our hatreds are the reflection of
our fove." (77).For Chirot and McCauley, a devotion to endogamy is danger-
ous (111). They illogically and without evidence equate it with the desire to
exterminate the Other. Behind a tremendous and commendable bringing
together of many different examples of mass killing lies a moraltale advocat-
ing total assimilation and the elimination of group differences, as the preser-
vation of group difference results into making the Other an alien Other, an
enemy Other, an enemy Other that is a threat, and an alien Other that is
threat from within. So they offer up the tautological nostrum that there
would be no genocide or ethnic cleansing if there had been more intermar-
riage (119). By insisting on the logic of genocide, they engage in perpetuating
an illogic common to enlightenment rationalists in which anti-Semitism takes
on the guise of an irrational form of reason in the advocacy of group death
through a higher moralism that is not regarded as murder. Perhaps this
illogic has more to do with explaining genocide than any of the factors of
legitimization pointed out.
-Howard Adelman
